Made in China. Built in America.

Chinese direct investment in U.S. manufacturing has accumulated over two decades. The Rhodium Group, which tracks Chinese foreign direct investment, estimates that Chinese companies have invested more than $148 billion in the United States since 2000, with manufacturing representing a significant share of that total. The peak years were 2015 through 2017, when Chinese investment in U.S. manufacturing reached several billion dollars annually before tightening capital controls and increased CFIUS scrutiny reduced deal flow.

The facilities that resulted from that investment period remain operational. A Chinese company that acquired an American auto-parts manufacturer in 2016 still owns and operates that facility today. The investment wave may have receded; the factories it left behind have not.

Counting Chinese-owned manufacturing facilities in the United States is complicated by corporate structure. Chinese companies often invest through American subsidiaries, joint ventures, or holding companies that do not carry Chinese names. A facility in rural Alabama may be owned by a Delaware LLC whose ultimate parent is a Shenzhen-listed conglomerate. Tracing ownership requires cross-referencing state corporate registrations, SEC filings, CFIUS disclosures, and investigative reporting.

Automotive components represent the largest single category of Chinese manufacturing investment in the United States. Chinese-owned or Chinese-affiliated suppliers operate facilities producing seats, glass, tires, brakes, electrical systems, and structural components for American automakers and their supply chains.

Fuyao Glass, the Chinese automotive glass manufacturer, operates a large facility in Moraine, Ohio — the former General Motors assembly plant that became the subject of the 2019 documentary 'American Factory.' The Moraine plant employs roughly 2,300 workers and produces windshields and auto glass for American and international automakers. Fuyao also operates a facility in Mount Zion, Illinois.

Yanfeng Automotive Interiors, a joint venture majority-owned by Huayu Automotive Systems (itself a subsidiary of SAIC Motor, a Chinese state-owned enterprise), operates multiple facilities in the United States producing interior components — instrument panels, door panels, overhead systems — for Ford, General Motors, Stellantis, and other automakers. Yanfeng is one of the world's largest automotive interior suppliers.

Wanxiang Group, a Chinese auto-parts conglomerate, has operated in the United States since the 1990s and owns dozens of American manufacturing facilities producing universal joints, bearings, and other drivetrain components. Wanxiang also acquired the assets of A123 Systems, the American battery manufacturer, out of bankruptcy in 2013 — a transaction that drew congressional scrutiny at the time.

The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 created powerful incentives for domestic production of electric vehicle batteries and clean energy components. It also created a tension: Chinese companies that manufacture battery materials and components are well-positioned to benefit from those incentives by building or expanding U.S. facilities, but the IRA's foreign entity of concern (FEOC) provisions were designed to limit that benefit.

Gotion High-Tech, a Chinese battery manufacturer with ties to Volkswagen, announced plans for a $2.4 billion battery component plant in Big Rapids, Michigan. The project drew significant opposition from local officials and members of Congress concerned about Chinese ownership of battery manufacturing near American defense facilities. The project's status has been subject to ongoing review and political pressure.

Shinzoom, a Chinese graphite anode manufacturer, and several other Chinese materials companies have explored or announced U.S. manufacturing investments to supply the American battery supply chain. The FEOC provisions of the IRA, which restrict tax credits for vehicles using battery components from foreign entities of concern, have complicated but not eliminated Chinese participation in the American battery supply chain.

Chinese investment in American steel and aluminum production has been more limited than in downstream manufacturing, in part because the U.S. steel industry has historically been protective of domestic production and because Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum imports have reduced the economic rationale for Chinese companies to produce in the United States for the domestic market.

Tianjin Pipe Corporation (TPCO) operates a steel pipe manufacturing facility in Gregory, Texas, producing oil country tubular goods for the American energy sector. The facility, which opened in 2016 after years of construction, employs several hundred workers. It has been the subject of trade complaints and antidumping investigations related to the pricing of its products.

The broader pattern in basic materials is one of Chinese companies acquiring American producers rather than building greenfield facilities. These acquisitions — of specialty steel producers, aluminum fabricators, and chemical manufacturers — have in some cases been reviewed by CFIUS and in others have proceeded without formal review.

Chinese-owned manufacturing facilities in the United States employ American workers. The Fuyao plant in Moraine employs more than 2,000 people in a community that lost those jobs when GM closed the facility in 2008. Yanfeng's American operations employ thousands of workers across multiple states. Wanxiang's American facilities have employed American workers for decades.

The employment argument is frequently invoked by Chinese companies and their American advocates when investment faces political scrutiny. It is a legitimate consideration. It does not resolve the national security and economic security questions that Chinese ownership of manufacturing capacity raises — questions about technology transfer, supply chain reliability, data access, and the concentration of critical production capacity in companies subject to Chinese law and Chinese Communist Party direction.

The tension between employment benefits and security concerns is not unique to Chinese investment — it arises with investment from other countries as well. What distinguishes Chinese investment is the legal and political environment in China: the National Intelligence Law of 2017, which requires Chinese companies and citizens to cooperate with Chinese intelligence services; the Military-Civil Fusion strategy, which seeks to integrate civilian and military technology development; and the CCP's demonstrated willingness to direct the behavior of nominally private Chinese companies.

The primary federal mechanism for reviewing Chinese manufacturing investment is CFIUS — the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. CFIUS reviews transactions in which a foreign person acquires control of a U.S. business, with particular attention to transactions that could threaten national security. The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA) expanded CFIUS jurisdiction to cover certain non-controlling investments in sensitive industries and real estate near military installations.

CFIUS review is not comprehensive. It covers acquisitions and certain investments, but not all forms of Chinese commercial presence. A Chinese company that builds a greenfield facility in the United States — rather than acquiring an existing American company — may not trigger CFIUS review. A Chinese company that establishes an American subsidiary and grows it organically may not be subject to review. The gaps in CFIUS jurisdiction are well-documented and have been the subject of legislative proposals.

At the state level, more than two dozen states have enacted or proposed restrictions on Chinese land purchases, particularly near military installations. Some states have also enacted restrictions on Chinese investment in critical infrastructure. The patchwork of state-level restrictions reflects both genuine security concerns and, in some cases, broader political dynamics around China policy.