Chinese-Owned Factories in America

Chinese-affiliated companies operate the largest number of U.S. manufacturing facilities in the automotive components sector. Fuyao Glass, the world's largest automotive glass manufacturer and a supplier to Ford, GM, Toyota, and BMW, operates a 1.7-million-square-foot facility in Moraine, Ohio — the former General Motors assembly plant documented in the 2019 film American Factory. The Moraine facility employs approximately 2,300 workers and produces windshields and automotive glass for the North American market. Fuyao is a publicly traded Chinese company; its founder Cao Dewang has publicly described the Ohio investment as motivated in part by U.S. tariff avoidance.

Yanfeng Automotive Interiors, a joint venture between Yanfeng (a subsidiary of SAIC Motor, a Chinese state-owned enterprise) and Adient, operates 17 manufacturing facilities across the United States producing seating, instrument panels, door panels, and overhead systems for major automakers. Yanfeng's U.S. facilities are located in Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, Tennessee, Alabama, and South Carolina. SAIC Motor is majority state-owned; Yanfeng's U.S. operations give a Chinese SOE-linked entity a significant presence in the supply chains of every major automaker operating in North America.

Nexteer Automotive, a steering systems manufacturer acquired by Pacific Century Motors (a Chinese state-linked consortium) in 2010, operates its global headquarters and primary manufacturing facility in Saginaw, Michigan. Nexteer supplies electric power steering systems to GM, Ford, Fiat Chrysler, and other automakers. The company's ownership structure — ultimately tracing to AVIC, the state-owned Aviation Industry Corporation of China — has been the subject of congressional scrutiny given AVIC's role as a primary supplier to the Chinese military aviation program.

Chinese companies have acquired or established steel and metals manufacturing capacity in the United States through a combination of greenfield investment and acquisition of distressed legacy assets. Tianjin Pipe Corporation operates a seamless steel pipe manufacturing facility in Gregory, Texas — a $1.1 billion greenfield investment completed in 2016. The facility produces oil country tubular goods for the U.S. energy sector. TPCO America, the U.S. subsidiary, employs approximately 600 workers and has been the subject of antidumping and countervailing duty investigations by the Commerce Department.

Zhongwang USA, a subsidiary of China Zhongwang Holdings, invested approximately $2 billion in an aluminum extrusion facility in Shelby Township, Michigan. The project was announced in 2017 with promises of 2,500 jobs. Federal investigators subsequently determined that the facility was used as part of a scheme to evade U.S. antidumping duties on Chinese aluminum products — importing Chinese aluminum slabs, minimally processing them in Michigan, and re-exporting them as U.S.-origin product. The Justice Department indicted Liu Zhongtian, Zhongwang's chairman, in 2019 on charges including conspiracy to evade antidumping duties; the Michigan facility was seized.

GreenFirst Forest Products, a Canadian company with significant Chinese investment through Itasca Capital (which has ties to Chinese investors), acquired several U.S. lumber mills. More directly, Shandong Yulong Gold Mine acquired the Hycroft Mine in Nevada — one of the largest gold and silver deposits in the United States — through a series of transactions. The acquisition raised concerns among Nevada officials and federal reviewers about Chinese state-linked ownership of a significant domestic precious metals resource, though the transaction did not trigger a mandatory CFIUS review under the pre-FIRRMA framework.

WH Group, the Chinese pork processing conglomerate, acquired Smithfield Foods — the world's largest pork producer and processor — in 2013 for $7.1 billion. The acquisition, which cleared CFIUS review, gave WH Group ownership of Smithfield's 146,000 acres of U.S. farmland, 500 farms, and 40 processing facilities across 12 states. Smithfield's U.S. operations produce approximately 30 percent of U.S. pork supply. The acquisition remains the largest Chinese acquisition of a U.S. food company on record and the largest Chinese acquisition of U.S. agricultural assets.

Fufeng Group, a Chinese corn wet-milling company, announced plans in 2022 to build a $700 million wet corn milling facility in Grand Forks, North Dakota — approximately 12 miles from Grand Forks Air Force Base, which hosts the 319th Reconnaissance Wing and is being developed as a base for next-generation high-altitude surveillance drones. The Air Force publicly opposed the project, stating that the proximity of Chinese-owned industrial facilities to sensitive flight operations and the potential for electromagnetic interference with base communications posed national security risks. The Grand Forks City Council approved the project; the Air Force's objections did not trigger a formal CFIUS review because the transaction involved greenfield construction rather than acquisition of a U.S. business.

Chinese entities have acquired approximately 383,000 acres of U.S. agricultural land as of 2023, according to USDA data — a figure that has increased from approximately 13,000 acres in 2010. The acquisitions are concentrated in Texas, Missouri, North Carolina, and Virginia. Several of the largest acquisitions involve land near military installations: a 130,000-acre Texas ranch acquired by a Chinese billionaire is located near Laughlin Air Force Base; Chinese-linked entities have acquired farmland in proximity to military training ranges in multiple states. The USDA's foreign land ownership reporting requirements have significant gaps — reporting is voluntary for acquisitions below certain thresholds, and beneficial ownership through U.S.-incorporated entities is not always captured.

Sinovel Wind Group, a Chinese state-linked wind turbine manufacturer, established a manufacturing presence in the United States before being convicted in 2018 of trade secret theft from AMSC (formerly American Superconductor). The case — in which Sinovel stole the software code controlling AMSC's wind turbine electrical systems, eliminating its need for AMSC's products — resulted in a $1.5 million criminal fine and documented the risks of Chinese manufacturing partnerships in the clean energy sector. AMSC's market capitalization fell from approximately $1.6 billion to under $100 million following the theft.

CATL, the world's largest electric vehicle battery manufacturer, has announced plans for a $3.5 billion battery manufacturing facility in the United States, structured as a licensing arrangement with Ford Motor Company to avoid foreign entity of concern restrictions under the Inflation Reduction Act. The BlueOval SK Battery Park in Marshall, Michigan — a joint venture between Ford and SK On — will use CATL's lithium iron phosphate battery technology under a licensing agreement. The structure has been scrutinized by congressional Republicans as a potential circumvention of the IRA's FEOC provisions; the Treasury Department issued guidance in December 2023 addressing the licensing arrangement question.

Gotion High-Tech, a Chinese battery manufacturer in which Volkswagen holds a minority stake, announced a $2.4 billion battery component manufacturing facility in Big Rapids, Michigan in 2023. Gotion's largest shareholder is Guoxuan High-Tech, which is majority-owned by the Chinese government through state investment vehicles. The Michigan facility was approved for state incentives before the ownership structure was fully disclosed; subsequent reporting revealed that Gotion's parent company's articles of association include a provision requiring the company to establish a Chinese Communist Party committee. Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer subsequently expressed concern about the state incentive package.

The proximity of Chinese-owned or Chinese-linked manufacturing and agricultural facilities to U.S. military installations has been documented in multiple congressional oversight reports and GAO assessments. The cases cluster around several categories: agricultural land acquisitions near Air Force bases with sensitive drone and surveillance operations; industrial facilities near naval shipyards and submarine bases; and data center and telecommunications infrastructure near signals intelligence facilities.

The Fufeng/Grand Forks case is the most extensively documented. Grand Forks Air Force Base hosts the 319th Reconnaissance Wing, which operates RQ-4 Global Hawk high-altitude surveillance drones, and is being developed as a primary base for the MQ-9 Reaper and next-generation surveillance platforms. The Air Force's formal objection letter, obtained through congressional oversight, cited concerns about: electromagnetic spectrum monitoring of base communications; observation of flight patterns and operational schedules; and the potential for the facility's grain drying and processing equipment to interfere with base radar systems. The letter noted that the 12-mile proximity placed the facility within the Air Force's standard buffer zone for sensitive operations.

In Texas, a 130,000-acre ranch in Val Verde County acquired by Sun Guangxin, a Chinese billionaire with documented ties to the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, is located approximately 40 miles from Laughlin Air Force Base — a primary pilot training installation. Texas enacted legislation in 2023 prohibiting Chinese nationals and Chinese government-linked entities from acquiring real property in Texas, with specific provisions addressing proximity to military installations. The legislation was challenged in federal court; a district court initially enjoined enforcement, and the case was on appeal as of mid-2024.

The CFIUS real estate jurisdiction established by FIRRMA covers acquisitions near specific listed military installations and sensitive government facilities, but does not cover greenfield construction — a gap that the Fufeng/Grand Forks case exposed. The Biden administration directed CFIUS to review whether its real estate jurisdiction should be extended to cover greenfield construction by foreign persons near sensitive facilities, and whether the list of covered installations should be expanded. Proposed regulatory changes were under review as of 2024.

In the absence of comprehensive federal authority over Chinese greenfield manufacturing investments, a growing number of states have enacted their own restrictions. As of mid-2024, 12 states had enacted or were advancing legislation restricting Chinese land and facility acquisitions near military installations or in sensitive sectors. The approaches vary: Texas and Florida have enacted broad prohibitions on Chinese nationals and government-linked entities acquiring real property; other states have focused on agricultural land or proximity to specific installation types.

The state-level restrictions have been challenged on constitutional grounds — primarily on the basis that they conflict with federal foreign investment authority and may violate the Equal Protection Clause by targeting nationals of a specific country. Federal courts have reached different conclusions on the constitutional questions; the circuit split has created uncertainty about the enforceability of state restrictions and the appropriate division of authority between federal and state governments over foreign investment in real property.

The federal review gap is most acute for greenfield investments — new construction by Chinese-linked entities that does not involve acquisition of an existing U.S. business and therefore does not trigger CFIUS jurisdiction. The Fufeng/Grand Forks case is the clearest example, but the pattern extends to battery manufacturing facilities, solar panel assembly operations, and agricultural processing plants. The Commerce Department has authority to review certain foreign investments in U.S. businesses under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, but this authority has not been systematically applied to greenfield manufacturing investments. Legislation to close the greenfield gap has been introduced in Congress but had not been enacted as of mid-2024.